λy + (1 − λ)x h (which may still be very rapid, if y is 'much' preferred to x h ). Hence, it imposes a bound on the instantaneous rate of change in preferences, as a function of λ. Furthermore, this bound is required to be uniform in a neighborhood of h.
Proposition 1 Let be a preference that admits a monotonic, continuous, Bernoullian, normalized representation (I , u ). Then satisfies Axiom 1 if and only if I is locally Lipschitz in the interior of its domain.
Proof: (If) : Functionally, the displayed equation in Axiom 1 is equivalent to
Notice that the second equality uses the assumption that I is normalized. Since u •h n → u •h in the sup norm, for every ε ∈ 0, min s [u (g (s ) ) − u (h(s ))] , and for n large enough, max s |u (h(s )) −
u (h n (s ))| < min s [u (g (s )) − u (h(s ))] − ε, so that, for every s , u (h n (s )) = u (h(s )) + [u (h n (s )) − u (h(s ))] < u (h(s )) + min s [u (g (s )) − u (h(s ))] − ε ≤ u (h(s )) + u (g (s )) − u (h(s )) − ε = u (g (s )) − ε.
In other words, u (g (s )) − u (h n (s )) > ε for all s and all n large enough. Moreover, for n large enough, λ n ε + h n ∈ B 0 (Σ, u (X )). Since I is monotonic, and rearranging terms,
This implies that, for a suitable ε > 0,
To sum up, for every h such that u • h ∈ intB 0 (Σ, u (X )), there are ε > 0 and y ∈ X such that
Since I is monotonic, by Proposition 4 in Rockafellar (1980), I is directionally Lipschitzian; by Theorem 3 therein, the Clarke-Rockafeller derivative
Therefore, the constant function 0 is in the interior of {a : 
for some y ∈ X . Then, for all (h n ) → h and (λ n ) ↓ 0, eventually
. Then a fortiori, for every s ,
, and therefore
Because h is interior, there is δ ∈ (0,
] such that u • h + δ = u • g for some g ∈ ; for such g , the above argument implies that u (g (s )) < u (h n (s )) + ε for all s , and of course g (s ) h(s ) for all s . By monotonicity, conclude that, for all n sufficiently large,
Finally, by choosing n large enough, we can ensure that I (u • h n ) < I (u • h) + ε, and therefore
Rearranging terms yields Eq. (1), so the axiom holds.
B Nice MBL preferences
Proposition 2 A monotonic, isotone and concave function I : B 0 (Σ, Γ) → (for some interval Γ) is nice everywhere in the interior of its domain.
Proof:
Recall that a monotone concave I is locally Lipschitz; furthermore, ∂ I coincides with the superdifferential of I (e.g. Rockafellar, 1980, p. 278) , and it is monotone, in the sense that
Fix c ∈ int B 0 (Σ, Γ) and suppose that Q 0 ∈ ∂ I (c ). Then, for every c ∈ int B 0 (Σ, Γ) and every
Since c is interior, the setΓ = Γ ∩ {γ ∈ : γ > c (s ) ∀s } is non-empty.
Morevoer, for any γ ∈Γ, and for all
and I is monotonic, this requires that
In particular, pick α, β ∈Γ, with α > β . Since I is isotone, I (1 S α) > I (1 S β ). By the mean-value theorem (Lebourg, 1979) , there must be µ ∈ (0, 1) and
and therefore I (1 S α) = I (1 S β ): contradiction. Therefore, I must be nice at c .
We now provide an axiom for MBL preferences that ensures niceness. There are obvious similarities with Axiom 1.
Axiom 2 (Non-Negligible Worsenings at h)
There are y ∈ X with y ≺ h and g ∈ with g (s ) ≺
This axiom rules out the possibility that preferences may be 'flat' when moving from h toward pointwise less desirable acts g . We argue as for Axiom 1: the individual's evaluation of λy + (1 − λ)x h changes linearly with λ, whereas her evaluation of λg + (1 − λ)h may worsen in arbitrary non-linear ways as λ increases from 0 to 1. Axiom 2 states that, when λ is close to 0, this worsening is comparable to the linear decrease in preference that applies to λy + (1 − λ)x h (which may still be very slow, if y is 'almost' as good as x h ).
Mas-Colell (1977) characterizes preferences over consumption bundles (i.e. on n + ) represented by a (locally) Lipschitz and 'regular' utility function; his notion of regularity is related to niceness (cf. p. 1411); for instance, if utility is continuously differentiable, the requirement is that its gradient be non-vanishing on n
++
. Mas-Colell's axiom is not directly related to ours.
Proposition 3 Let be an MBL preference with representation (I , u ), and assume that I is normalized. Then satisfies Axiom 2 at h ∈ int if and only if I is nice at u • h.
Proof: (If): As in the proof of Proposition 1, for g , y , (h n ), (λ n ) as in the axiom,
, and so, by monotonicity of I ,
Rearranging,
Since h n → h and I is continuous, for every ε > 0, eventually I (u • h n ) ≥ I (u • h) − ε, and so 
(Only if): Conversely, suppose I is nice at u • h. Since h is interior, there is δ > 0 such that
Hence, for all sequences λ n → 0 and h n → h (acts), and for all ε ∈ (0, −I 0 (u •h; − 1 2 δ)), eventually
In particular, find y ∈ X such that y ≺ h and I (u •h)−u (y ) < − δ) on both sides of this inequality to conclude that
δ), and so eventually
Also, for n large,
Rewriting yields
). Hence, finally, monotonicity implies
as required.
C Calculations for Example 4
Since I is continuously differentiable, it is 'strictly differentiable': see Clarke (1983, Corollary to Prop. 2.2.1). In particular, for all e ∈ B 0 (Σ), h n → h and
(7) will hold for n large: hence, in this case f * h g . This is in particular the case if h 1 > h 2 ≥ 0. To analyze cases 2 and 3 in the text, note first that, for any pair f , g ∈ , using the formula for the difference of two cubes, f g iff
In case 3 (γ = 0), divide Eqs. (4) and (5) by (λ n ) 3 and set ε = 0 to obtain the conditions
and by inspection the l.h.s. of the second inequality is the negative of the l.h.s. of the first.
Furthermore, the l.h.s of the first condition equals
. Therefore, for any n, when ε = 0, Eq. (4) holds as a strict inequality, whereas the inequality in Eq. (5) fails. Hence, the same is true for any n when ε is positive but small. Thus.
In case 2 (γ > 0), first take ε = 0. We claim that Eqs. (4) and (5) (5) can be rewritten as
It is apparent that this is the negative of the l.h.s of Eq. (4) when ε = 0 and h = [γ, γ] , except that we first use P 2 and then P 1 , rather than the opposite as in Eq. (4). This proves the claim.
Next, we claim that Eq. (4) holds as a strict inequality, which proves the assertion in the text
and γ > 0, the first and third terms in braces are strictly greater for i = 1 (4) is the difference of these terms, multiplied by P 1 · λ n [1, −1] > 0, and hence it is strictly positive.
Finally, if ε > 0, and since
, which, as noted above, implies that f ε * h g ε .
As noted in Footnote 10, here ∂ I (0) contains only the zero vector. However, consider the monotonic, locally Lipschitz functional J : 2 → given by J (h) = min(I (h), h 1 + I (h)). Then 
D Relevant priors: a behavioral test
We conclude by showing that, given an interior act h, whether a probability P ∈ ba 1 (Σ) belongs to the set C (h) can be ascertained without invoking Theorems 6 or 7; indeed, using only the the incomplete, discontinuous preference * h (cf. the definition of C * (f ) in GMM, p. 158).
Definition 1 For any act f ∈ , a local lower certainty equivalent of f at h ∈ int is a prize x f ,h ∈ X such that, for all y ∈ X , y ≺ x f ,h implies f * h y and y x f ,h implies f * h y .
Furthermore, fix P ∈ ba 1 (Σ) and f ∈ , and suppose that f = n i =1
x i 1 E i for a collection of distinct prizes x 1 , . . . , x n and a measurable partition E 1 , . . . , E n of S. Then, define
That is, x P, f ∈ X is a mixture of the prizes x 1 , . . . , x n delivered by f , with weights given by the probabilities that P assigns to each event E 1 , . . . , E n . We then have:
Corollary 4 For any P ∈ ba 1 (Σ) and h ∈ int such that I is nice at u • h, P ∈ C (h) if and only if, for all f ∈ int , x f ,h x P,f .
Proof:
We show that u (x f ,h ) = min P∈C (h) P(u • f ); thus, the condition in the Corollary states that P satisfies P(u • f ) ≥ min P ∈C (h) P (u • f ) for all interior f , so by linearity P(a ) ≥ min P ∈C (h) P(a )
for all a ∈ B 0 (Σ), and P ∈ C (h) then follows from standard arguments.
If x f ,h is as in Def. 1, then min P∈C (h) P(u • f ) ≥ u (y ) for all y ≺ x f ,h by (1) in Theorem 6, and so min P∈C (h) P(u • f ) ≥ u (x f ,h ). Conversely, for every y with u (y ) < min P∈C (h) P(u • f ), there are ε > 0, y ∈ X , and f ∈ with u (y ) = u (y ) + ε, u • f = u • f − ε and u (y ) ≤ min P∈C (h) P(u • f ); then, by (2) in Theorem 7, since (f , y ) is a spread of (f , y ), f * h y . This implies that y x f ,h . Hence, min P∈C (h) P(u • f ) ≤ u (x f ,h ) as well.
E Additional properties of * h
In addition to agreeing with on X , provided ∂ I (u • h) = {Q 0 }, * h satisfies the following additional properties.
Lemma 5
The preference * h is a monotonic, independent preorder.
